



This book began with a reference to Anders Åslund’s (1995) claim that 
‘Russia has become a market economy’. With the wisdom of hindsight, 
it can be said that this was a hasty statement considering the share of 
barter in the Russian economy in the 1990s. Later Åslund specified 
his claim by noting that Russia fulfils the five criteria of a functioning 
market economy: economic actors are independent from the state and 
are able to act freely, private ownership of enterprises is prevalent and 
property rights reasonably secured, prices and trade are predominantly 
free, state subsidies are limited and transactions are largely monetized 
(Åslund 2007: 2–3).
These criteria implicitly assume that economically relevant transac-
tions take place through market exchange where the price mechanism 
is the sole or main criterion regulating these transactions. This book has 
contested these assumptions and argued that an understanding of the 
functioning of the Russian markets requires a micro-level examination 
of the cultural, political, and moral foundations of the actual transac-
tions.
Åslund’s statement implies that the problems and peculiarities 
observed during transition were due to the Soviet legacy and would dis-
appear in due time. However, the anthropological students of transfor-
mation were quick to point out how the lack of knowledge of the actual 
economic processes on a grassroots level led to interpretation of even 
the problems which were actually created by the reformers themselves 
as Soviet legacies. The spread of barter, for example, followed from the 
monetization of the economy as an unintended result of the reforms 
and differed qualitatively from its Soviet-era counterpart. It was thus 
‘a product of shock therapy rather than the legacy of a paternalistic 
Soviet state’ (Burawoy and Verdery 1999b: 9; Woodruff 1999, 2000). 
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This book has similarly proposed that the formation and significance 
of personal networks in post-Soviet Russia is not only a legacy of con-
nections dating from the Soviet era but also an unintended result of the 
very process of transformation of the Russian society and economy: the 
turmoil of the post-Soviet transition forced the newly emerging Russian 
entrepreneurs to turn to their trusted social ties such as family, kin, 
friends, and acquaintances. 
The tendency of turning to one’s own personal network members 
went hand in hand with the mixing of the personal and public spheres 
of life, the overlap of instrumental and sociability aspects of mutual 
favors – such as the importance of obshchenie – and the use of the domes-
tic principle in justifying transactions. At the same time, this principle 
is constantly being challenged by the newly introduced logic of market 
competition, resulting in frictions and tensions in the networks. 
Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman (2005) raised recently a heated 
debate on the nature of the Russian economy and politics by claiming 
that Russia was a ‘normal’ case when compared to the countries in the 
same middle-income range. They sought to prove, among other things, 
that the scale of the collapse of the Russian economy and the decline 
in output in the 1990s have been exaggerated. In their opinion, when 
compared to other eastern European nations and the former Soviet 
Union, Russia’s economy performed by and large as might have been 
expected (see Shleifer and Treisman 2005).
Nevertheless, it is somewhat unfruitful to argue whether Russia is a 
‘normal’, ‘real’ or ‘distorted’ market economy. All market economies are 
different and a more urgent and interesting research task is to investi-
gate the specificity of the Russian case (Rautava and Sutela 2000: 242; 
Sutela 2003). 
This specificity is in many ways rooted in the developmental path of 
the Russian transition. Introducing a capitalist system in Russia was a 
conscious, foreign-led modernizing project whose critics were identi-
fied with the old Communist regime and thereby sidelined. Post-Soviet 
Russian capitalism was constructed with the help of foreign advisors 
in an extremely short time in the hope that market competition and 
capitalist relations would dissolve the old Soviet patterns and networks. 
In fact, the opposite seems to have happened: the combined result of 
the imported capitalism and the existing networks produced a socioeco-
nomic and political system very different from the original intentions 
of the reformers. 
In Western countries, on the contrary, capitalism developed during a 
long period of time, in which it was constantly exposed to various forms 
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of criticism. Probably partly because of this differing evolutionary path, 
this study found no support for the existence of a ‘new spirit’ of Russian 
network capitalism similar to the one proposed by Luc Boltanski and 
Ève Chiapello (2005) in the French context. This kind of spirit would 
stress the importance of continuous networking and constant mobility 
and would have an aversion to stable and strong ties. As has become 
apparent in this book the Russian IT industry seems, on the contrary, to 
lean in many ways on trusted and established personal ties.
As noted in the introduction to this book, the development of infor-
mation and communications technology has also, in addition to its 
functions in the economy, an important political role in the post-Soviet 
Russia. President Medvedev himself brought up the link between tech-
nological progress and political freedoms in his ‘Go, Russia!’ – speech 
in 2009: 
The growth of modern information technologies, something we will 
do our best to facilitate, gives us unprecedented opportunities for 
the realization of fundamental political freedoms, such as freedom of 
speech and assembly. It allows us to identify and eliminate hotbeds 
of corruption. It gives us direct access to the site of almost any event. 
It facilitates the direct exchange of views and knowledge between 
people all around the world. Society is becoming more open and 
transparent than ever – even if the ruling class does not necessarily 
like this.
(Medvedev 2009b)
The president’s faith in the democratizing effects of technological 
development contrasts starkly with the avalanche of worrying news 
about the state of the Russian democracy. These include, among others, 
harassment of opposition demonstrations, killings of journalists, biased 
broadcasting by the main national TV channels, selective punishment 
of citizens or democratic institutions under various pretexts, and arbi-
trary practices of the Russian police. The president also neglects the 
possibility that new technology may be used to monitor, control, and 
repress citizens. Moreover, his statement is internally inconsistent since 
‘the Russian ruling class’ is simultaneously supposed to facilitate democ-
ratization through the means of modern information technologies and 
not to like this development. 
The president returned to the modernization theme and the rela-
tion between information technology and politics in his speech at 
the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum plenary session in 
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June 2010, citing several recent policy reforms aimed at building ‘a 
modern, strong and prosperous Russia’. This new Russia would, accord-
ing to him, be among the co-founders of the new global economic order 
and political leadership (Medvedev 2010). 
The new Russian economy would not be built ‘from above’, but 
through the efforts of private business in a competitive environment 
where the job of the state is ‘to ensure a good business climate for 
Russian and foreign entrepreneurs, and a fair and honest competitive 
environment’. The most ambitious of the new reforms are the plans to 
make Moscow a global financial center and to create a Russian version 
of the Silicon Valley near the capital. The reforms also include, among 
other things, incentives to innovation companies, a law limiting pos-
sibilities of arresting businesspeople in connection with investigations 
into economic crimes, simplifying immigration rules for highly quali-
fied foreign specialists, and cutting the list of strategic enterprises. 
This kind of new Russian economy would go hand in hand with the 
development of democracy in a process where information technology 
has a specific role:
Information technology is one of the key elements in developing 
democracy in general. The speed and quality of feedback between the 
authorities and society, greater technological possibilities for guaran-
teeing freedom of speech, and internet technology in operation of 
political and electoral systems are all important for developing our 
political structures and institutions.
(Medvedev 2010)
Even though both the intrinsic connection between capitalism and 
democracy in general and the blessings of information technology in 
particular may well be questioned, the emergence of a more diversi-
fied economic structure in Russia with a great number of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises is more likely to be conducive to democrati-
zation than an economy dominated by a few big companies owned or 
controlled by the state. Similarly, the role of the Internet and new tech-
nology for political and opposition activism in Russia is likely to grow 
in importance in parallel with the decrease of the Russian traditional 
media’s ability to fulfill its watchdog function (cf. Lonkila 2008).
However, as with the efforts to weed out corruption from the Russian 
economy and society, the question is, who is going to implement these 
macro-level reforms and how? The answer has to do with the func-
tioning of personal networks, which has been the focus of this book. 
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Because of its qualitative nature, this book has not attempted to answer 
the question of whether or not the Russian economy and networks are 
dominated by immoral and illegal practices. Rather, it suggests, along 
the lines proposed by Oleg Kharkhordin (2005, 2009), that personal 
networks may be one of the main resources that the Russian society and 
economy have at their disposal and therefore merit special attention.
